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Agricultural Labor Markets and 
Immigration
By Robert D. Emerson
JEL Classifications: J43, J61, J68
Foreign workers have been an important part of U.S.
labor-intensive segments of agriculture throughout U.S.
history. Typically, these are specialty crops such as tree
crops, vegetables, and nursery and greenhouse crops. Each
requires large amounts of labor relative to other resources
used in production. Tree crop and vegetable production
on only has very large labor requirements, but the require-
ments are often concentrated into a very short time span
of a relatively few weeks, particularly at harvest time.
Nursery and greenhouse production has large, but nearly
year-round labor requirements. While there has been con-
siderable mechanization in agriculture, a number of fruits
and vegetables, particularly for the fresh market, continue
to be hand-harvested. Most greenhouse and nursery pro-
duction utilizes manual labor.
Hired farm employment in the United States is domi-
nated by foreign-born workers: 78% of crop workers were
foreign-born in 2001-2002 (Carroll et al., 2005, p. 3).
The same report indicated that 53% of crop workers
lacked proper authorization to work in the United States
during this same time period (p. 6). Most of the recent
policy debate has concerned the latter group, the illegal
foreign population in the United States. Although agricul-
tural workers are now a small part of this population esti-
mated to be 11.5 - 12 million in 2006, the proportion of
workers in agriculture who are illegal is among the highest
of any occupation (Passell, 2006). With the major pres-
ence of illegal foreign workers in agriculture and the legis-
lative emphasis on illegal foreign workers, there are two
sets of economic issues to isolate: 1) the economic effects
of a significant augmentation of the workforce through
legal immigration, and 2) the economic effects of working
in an illegal immigration status. Emphasis is given to the
following economic indicators regarding the agricultural
labor market: wage rates, length of time working in agri-
culture, technology, crop mix, and capital flows.
Economic Issues
Wage Rates
Legal immigrants.  While some economists suggest that
increased immigration has reduced wage rates for native-
born, unskilled workers (Borjas, 2003), most have found
negative wage effects of increased immigration extremely
difficult to demonstrate once all appropriate adjustments
are made. For example, the 1980 Mariel Boatlift from
Cuba to Miami increased the Miami labor force by 7%,
but had no significant effect on wages of comparable
Miami workers (Card, 1990). A second example is the
sudden, unanticipated 14% increase in the Israeli labor
force by Russian émigrés over 1989-1996, resulting in no
significant wage effects in the Israeli economy (Gandal,
Hanson, & Slaughter, 2004). These two cases encompass
both extremes of the skill distribution of immigrants: the
Mariel Boatlift was a relatively low-skilled population,
while the Russian emigrants to Israel were a relatively
skilled group. Card (2005) summarizes studies based on
U.S. data: “. . . although immigration has a strong effect
on relative supplies of different skill groups, local labor
market outcomes of low skilled natives are not much
affected by these relative supply shocks” (p. F321). 
The most important economic consideration in
absorption of large numbers of immigrants without signif-
icant wage effects is that the host country operates as an
open economy with minimal restrictions on trade in
goods, production resources, and capital. The economic58 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1)
adjustments mitigating the wage
effects are technological change,
changes in the output mix of the
economy, and the employment of
additional factors of production
complementary to the additional
labor (Gandal, Hanson, & Slaughter,
2004; Freeman, 2006).
Unauthorized workers.  Not only are
most hired workers in agriculture for-
eign-born, but over half are unautho-
rized for work in the United States.
Although there may be no significant
wage effects from immigration, there
are likely to be significant wage dif-
ferences between authorized and
unauthorized workers. The average
earnings reported in Table 1 suggest
sizeable differences in reported
hourly earnings by authorized and
unauthorized workers. Observed dif-
ferences were 8 and 9% for the peri-
ods 1989-1998 and 1999-2001,
respectively. Following 2001, how-
ever, real hourly earnings for unau-
thorized workers fell 13% below
authorized worker earnings for the
2002-2004 period.
There are a number of reasons
why the earnings of groups of work-
ers could differ. For example, they
may have different levels of experi-
ence, they may be of different age
groups or gender, or they may be
doing different types of work, etc. A
standard way to address the question
and isolate the effect of legal status, is
to utilize the observed earnings of
different types of workers to predict
their earnings in each legal status
while holding all other worker and
job characteristics constant. Esti-
mates based on the 1989-2004
NAWS data for various combinations
of worker and employment charac-
teristics are summarized in box 1.
Estimates suggest a wage penalty of
11% after 2001 for a typical illegal
worker in agriculture. The wage pen-
alty is much higher for skilled work-
ers, but most agricultural workers are
unskilled, not skilled.
The estimated wage penalties
summarized in box 1 are qualitatively
similar to earlier research by Taylor
(1992) and Isé and Perloff (1995).
The estimates are also in line with an
estimated wage penalty of 14% to
24% for the broader labor force
based on legalization under the Gen-
eral Legalization Program of the
1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (IRCA) (Kossoudji & Cobb-
Clark, 2002). 
The ultimate question is what
will happen to wage rates in agricul-
ture under alternative immigration
policy scenarios? Suppose for the
moment that there are no changes in
technology with the change in immi-
gration policy so that the structure of
labor demand by agriculture remains
unchanged. With full legalization of
unauthorized workers and access to
guest workers, market-determined
wage rates would be expected to
remain at the level they currently are
for legal workers; the only difference
would be the absence of a wage pen-
alty for the formerly illegal workers.1
The direct wage cost would clearly be
1. Note that the farm wage is largely 
determined by the nonfarm wage, 
and as noted earlier, research has 
largely shown that increased num-
bers of legal immigrants in the 
economy have had no significant 
effect on wage rates.  Also, as sum-
marized in the following section, 
research does not suggest an exodus 
from agriculture with legalization.
Box 1.  Estimated wage penalties 
for lack of legal status*
• 11% after 2001 for a typical ille-
gal worker in agriculture 
(unskilled, employed directly by 
a grower, paid hourly, and work-
ing in California).
• As large as 23% of the predicted 
authorized wage.
• Two to three times larger in 
many cases following 2001 
compared to 1989-2001.
• Two to three times larger for 
skilled work than for unskilled 
work.**
• Larger for piece rate work than 
for hourly wage work.
• Smaller for workers employed 
by labor contractors than for 
workers employed directly by 
growers.
*Iwai et al., 2006a.  For ease of com-
parison with other estimates in the 
literature, these and subsequent 
wage effects have been converted to 
the estimated penalty as a percent-
age of the wage as an authorized 
worker.  In Iwai et al. (2006a), the 
effects were expressed as estimated 
premium for being legal as a per-
centage of the predicted wage as an 
unauthorized worker.
** The Iwai et al. (2006a) definition for 
a skilled worker was someone doing 
supervisory work.
Table 1. Real average hourly earnings for U.S. agricultural workers: constant 
(2004) dollars.
Item 1989-1998 1999-2001 2002-2004
Authorized Workers 7.49 7.97 8.31
Unauthorized Workers 6.90 7.26 7.25
Difference
      Dollars 0.59 0.71 1.06
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higher for employers under this sce-
nario. However, a significant part of
the eliminated wage penalty must be
interpreted as a risk premium to the
employer to compensate for potential
losses through: 1) uncertainty about
the potential removal of labor at a
critical production time resulting
from an immigration regulatory
change, 2) the potential discovery
and removal of illegal workers under
existing regulations, or 3) facing pen-
alties from having employed illegal
workers.  The remainder of the wage
penalty is best attributed to the lower
opportunity cost of illegal workers
resulting from their more limited
alternatives in an illegal employment
status. The removal of this latter
component of the penalty through
legalization would result in a higher
cost to employers if all workers were
legal. However, the opportunity cost
component has surely diminished
over time as illegal workers have
become more widely dispersed
throughout the economy (Passell,
2006). 
The alternative scenario of full
removal of illegal workers, closing the
border, and no significant guest
worker program could result in
increased wage rates in agriculture
under the assumption of immobile
capital and no changes in production
technology or product mix in agri-
culture or other industries. It is
argued below, however, that immo-
bile capital and fixed technology and
product mix are unlikely scenarios,
and that once these assumptions are
relaxed, the wage effects would be
greatly reduced or eliminated.
A related issue is the extent to
which illegal workers utilize more
public services than their tax contri-
butions. Moretti and Perloff (2000)
found that participation in welfare
programs2 by unauthorized farm
worker families was 8% in contrast to
27%, 30%, and 42% for citizen,
amnesty, and green card farm worker
families, respectively. Participation in
social insurance programs3 by unau-
thorized farm worker families was
2% in contrast to 21%, 38%, and
41% for citizen, amnesty, and green
card farm worker families, respec-
tively. Their analysis based on the
NAWS does not permit a compari-
son of the tax contributions with ser-
vice usage. However, since most per-
tinent tax payments are via payroll
deductions or sales tax collections,
the general belief is that tax contribu-
tions vary little by legal status. Exam-
ining the experience for overall U.S.
immigration, a National Research
Council publication reports that “…
the average long-term fiscal impacts
of immigration are generally found
to be positive under most scenar-
ios…” (Smith & Edmonston, 1997,
p. 354). Their analysis included not
only welfare and social insurance pro-
grams, but all public services, includ-
ing public education. Important
qualifications of their summary state-
ment are the variations by attributes
of the immigrants (a negative (posi-
tive) impact for immigrants with less
(more) than a high school educa-
tion), and a negative impact on state
and local governments in areas of
high immigration, but a strong posi-
tive impact at the federal level.
Work Duration
Labor availability is a continuing
concern by agricultural employers.
Labor-intensive specialty crops often
have a narrow window when certain
activities must be accomplished,
requiring relatively large amounts of
labor at those times, but relatively lit-
tle labor during the rest of the year.
Typically, crops requiring manual
labor for harvest are the most time-
critical and labor-intensive. The fact
that the grower’s income from the
crop is contingent upon a timely har-
vest of the crop, the availability of
labor at this point is obviously a
major concern to the grower. One
element of this concern is that cur-
rently undocumented workers in
agriculture would leave agriculture
for alternative employment once they
achieve a legal immigration status.
Similar concerns at the time of the
passage of IRCA resulted in the
Replenishment Agricultural Worker
program (RAW) of IRCA. The RAW
program provided authorization for
foreign workers to legally work in
agriculture if there were an agricul-
tural labor shortage as determined by
the Departments of Agriculture and
Labor. Since a shortage was never
declared by the Departments, the
RAW program was never actually
implemented.
Access to foreign workers has
been one way that agriculture has
attempted to secure a timely labor
force. The vast Bracero Program (P.L.
78) was operational from 1942-1964
largely in the western states authoriz-
ing the migration of labor from Mex-
ico to U.S. agriculture. The H-2A
program (and its precursors) for agri-
culture was initially between the Brit-
ish West Indies and the United
States, but more recently has focused
on workers from Mexico. Although
there were only 7,011 persons with
H-2A visas admitted in fiscal year
2005, there were 22,141 in fiscal year
2004; the largest number over the
past decade was in fiscal year 2000
with 33,292 persons with H-2A visas
admitted (U.S. DHS, 2006, Table
26). The H-2A program clearly
2. AFDC, Medicaid, food stamps, 
WIC, general assistance, or public 
housing.
3. Unemployment insurance, disabil-
ity insurance, or Social Security.60 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1)
accounts for a very small portion of
the agricultural labor force. The pro-
gram is typically found to be too
cumbersome and expensive by grow-
ers: “H[-]2A is bureaucratic, unre-
sponsive, expensive, and prone to liti-
gation” (U.S. Congress, 2006).
AgJOBS (Agricultural Job
Opportunities, Benefits, and Security
Act of 2007, H.R.371, S.340) is a
proposed guest worker program for
agriculture that has the support of
both labor advocates and grower
organizations. A similar AgJOBS bill
was attached to the U.S. Senate
immigration proposal, S. 2611 in the
109th Congress. The distinguishing
characteristic of AgJOBS, the Bracero
Program, and the H-2A program is
that each of them ties the worker for
varying periods of time specifically to
agricultural employment. The former
Bracero Program and the H-2A pro-
gram were, and are, strictly for agri-
cultural work with no path to perma-
nent residency in the United States.
The proposed AgJOBS offers adjust-
ment to a legal status for existing
unauthorized agricultural workers
meeting past agricultural work
requirements in the United States,
and with a possible path to perma-
nent residency. Nevertheless, the ini-
tial years have a required period of
work in agriculture. Future foreign
workers would be permitted through
a streamlined H-2A program, but
again restricted to agriculture.
The restrictions on legalized
workers to work proscribed amounts
of time in agriculture stem from con-
cerns by the industry about the avail-
ability of labor at critical times. In
the context of existing unauthorized
workers, the concern is that once
authorized for work in the United
States, they will leave agriculture for
employment in other industries.
Research to this point in time does
not support this concern. 
Existing research indicates that if
illegal agricultural workers were to be
legalized, their expected length of job
would  increase (Hashida & Perloff,
1996; Tran & Perloff, 2002; Iwai,
Napasintuwong, & Emerson, 2005;
Iwai, Emerson, & Walters, 2006b).
Iwai, Emerson, and Walters (2006b),
for example, find that the likelihood
of remaining in agriculture upon
being legalized ranges from a one
percentage point reduction to an
increase of 7.3 percentage points. Of
32 combinations of worker charac-
teristics considered, only five resulted
in a decrease in the likelihood of
remaining in agriculture; among
these five, only two were realistically
relevant combinations. One note-
worthy result is that the likelihood of
remaining in agriculture generally
increased modestly following 2001;
correspondingly, the increases in the
likelihood of remaining in agriculture
attributed to a hypothetical legaliza-
tion were generally smaller after
2001. A somewhat different method-
ology used by Iwai, Napasintuwong,
and Emerson (2005) suggests an
increase in job duration of an unau-
thorized worker of 4.4% upon
becoming authorized under a pro-
gram such as the Seasonal Agricul-
tural Worker (SAW) program under
IRCA, or by 3.9% by becoming a
permanent resident. The effects are
not large, amounting to slightly
fewer than three more work days.
However, they are positive when the
concern has been that once legal sta-
tus is obtained, there would be less
attachment to agriculture.
Hashida and Perloff (1996) and
Tran and Perloff (2002), using data
from the 1989-91 NAWS, found
qualitatively similar results. A some-
what different approach was taken by
Emerson and Napasintuwong
(2002), who examined information
on the number of years workers
reported having worked in agricul-
ture in the United States. Their
results suggested that the expected
number of years of work were larger
for authorized than for unauthorized
workers.
Technology and Labor
U.S. agriculture has a long history of
technological innovations, with con-
siderable evidence suggesting that
new technologies developed in the
United States save labor given a his-
tory of relatively abundant land
(Hayami & Ruttan, 1970). An early
example of agricultural producers
responding to changes in the labor
market by changing production tech-
niques is the adoption of the
mechanical tomato harvester in Cali-
fornia. A major source of labor for
California agriculture was the Bracero
Program until its termination in
1964. Schmitz and Seckler (1970)
summarize the adoption:
The first 25 harvesters were
used in California in 1961.
By 1964, 75 were in use; a
year later, 250. The number
increased to 1,000 in 1967
(Lynch, 1968), when
approximately 80 percent of
the California acreage was
harvested by machines. (p.
570)
The agricultural labor market experi-
ence starting in the 1970s through
the present time has been the reverse
of the termination of the Bracero Pro-
gram: workers have increasingly
flowed across the border seeking
employment opportunities.  Napas-
intuwong and Emerson (2004),
using data for Florida, found that
while technology had been labor-sav-
ing prior to IRCA, it became labor-
neutral following IRCA as foreign-
born workers became the dominant
labor source for agriculture. In other1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1) CHOICES 61
words, technologies employed in
agriculture no longer had the effect
of continually reducing the quantity
of labor relative to other inputs for
given input price ratios.
Shifts in technology can also alter
the extent to which inputs are substi-
tutable for each other. Napasintu-
wong and Emerson (2004) found
that labor was a substitute for capital
throughout most of the time period,
but from the mid-1980s through the
early 1990s, there was some indica-
tion that labor and capital were com-
plements when viewed as changes
due to a change in the price of capi-
tal. The implication is that if more
stringent immigration legislation
were to stimulate the ready availabil-
ity of new mechanized technology,
and at a lower cost, it would not nec-
essarily follow that the employment
of hired labor would decrease.
Another interesting finding is that
capital and labor are more easily sub-
stitutable when returns to labor
change than when capital prices
change. This implies that it is easier
to substitute capital for labor (such as
adopting mechanized technology)
when labor becomes more expensive
than it is to substitute labor for capi-
tal when capital becomes more
expensive. In the context of the
mechanical tomato harvester noted
earlier, once the harvester was
adopted in the late 1960s, a larger
reduction in the relative price of
labor would be required to shift back
to hand harvesting than the initial
reduction in the relative price of capi-
tal required to adopt the harvester. 
The substitutability of labor and
capital has implications for various
forms of immigration policies. For
example, a policy sealing the border,
deporting all unauthorized workers,
and authorizing no guest workers
could result in temporarily higher
wage rates for agriculture in the
immediate term. The Napasintu-
wong and Emerson (2004) substitut-
ability estimates suggest that such a
policy would stimulate the adoption
of additional available labor-saving
technology, with increased substitu-
tion of capital for labor. With a
hypothetical 10% increase in the
wage rate, their estimates suggest an
18% increase in the capital-to-labor
ratio. By contrast, a less restrictive
policy toward foreign workers would
reduce the incentives for adopting
new mechanical technology, and
reduce the extent of substitution of
capital for labor.
Crop Mix
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  t e c h -
nology, producers also adjust to the
relative availability of labor through
changes in the mix of crops pro-
duced. Deflated cash receipts from
horticultural crops (vegetables, fruits
and nuts, and greenhouse and nurs-
ery crops) in the United States more
than doubled from 1970 to 2005
(Figure 1). By comparison, deflated
cash receipts for all U.S. crops and
livestock increased by less than 16%
over the same time period. This shift
in production is to be expected in
part from increased demand for
many horticultural products as con-
sumer income rises. However, the
real price for horticultural products
fell by 20% between 1970 and
1999.4 Moreover, since horticultural
products are internationally traded
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Figure 1. Index of deflated cash receipts for U.S. horticultural crops and all agriculture.62 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1)
is, met by a combination of domestic
and international supply.
Cash receipts from U.S. horticul-
tural crops represented 21% of all
U.S. agricultural cash receipts in
2005; the comparable figure for 1970
was less than 12% (U.S. Department
of Agriculture, 2006). However, since
horticultural crops are the labor-
intensive component of agriculture,
they represent a much larger portion
of expenditures on labor. Labor
expenditures by horticultural farms
were 51% of all farm labor expendi-
tures in 2002 (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 2004).
Clearly, the agricultural product
mix shifted over this 35-year period
toward more labor-intensive com-
modities. Napasintuwong and Emer-
son (2004) have found that agricul-
tural technology has become more
perishable crop-producing since
IRCA, and has become increasingly
biased against other types of agricul-
tural products such as the grains and
livestock. A restrictive immigration
policy of border closure, deportation
of unauthorized workers, and autho-
rizing no foreign workers could slow
the technology bias toward produc-
ing more perishable crops.
Capital Mobility
Coincident with the labor intensive
characteristic of specialty crop agri-
culture is that specialty crop farms
tend to be quite large with substan-
tial capital investment. Although
fruit and tree nut, vegetable and
melon, and greenhouse and nursery
farms represent only 9% of all U.S.
farms, they represented 26% of U.S.
farms with the value of land and
buildings exceeding $10,000,000 in
2002 (USDA, 2004). In the long
term there may not be increases in
wage rates due to either closing the
border or a shift to legal migration.
However, the short term effect of a
threat to close the border could be an
increased risk of labor availability.
Furthermore, one mechanism
through which market forces result in
minimal wage effects is the move-
ment of capital to either other indus-
tries or countries where the expected
return on capital is higher. One
example of this type of capital move-
ment is the shift of some leather leaf
fern production from Florida to
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Guatemala,
ostensibly in reaction to labor market
considerations. The result is
increased international trade in lieu
of labor mobility.
Summary
Opinions vary widely about the
future course of immigration policy
in the United States as evidenced by
the stark contrast between the House
of Representatives bill “Border Pro-
tection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal
Immigration Control Act of 2005”
referred to the Senate in January
2006 (H.R.4437 109th Congress,
2nd sess.), and the Senate bill “Com-
prehensive Immigration Reform Act
of 2006” passed in May 2006
(S.2611 109th Congress, 2nd sess.).
H.R. 4437 would close the border,
deport all illegal aliens, and offer no
provision for guest workers in agri-
culture or any other industry. S. 2611
would increase border enforcement,
authorize a guest worker program,
provide a path to permanent resi-
dency for guest workers, and incor-
p ora t e  Ag JO BS  as  a sub t it l e  of  t he
act. The House and the Senate were
unable to transcend their differences
prior to the November elections,
choosing not to meet in a Conference
Committee. The end result prior to
the November elections was the pas-
sage by the House and the Senate of a
House of Representatives sponsored
bill, the Secure Fence Act of 2006
(H.R. 6061), directing the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security to erect
fencing on hundreds of miles of the
U.S. – Mexico border. The bill was
signed by the President amid verbiage
that this was one small component of
comprehensive immigration reform.
Subsequently, limited funds for fenc-
ing were authorized in the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s appro-
priations bill for fiscal year 2007.
Given the strong differences of
opinion on immigration reform, does
economics offer any useful guide-
lines? While economics typically can-
not determine which policy approach
is best (that is a political choice), it
4. The price index is a quality 
adjusted price index calculated 
from data provided by Eldon Ball, 
and deflated by the GDP deflator.  
See Ball et al. (1997) for the meth-
odology.
Table 2. Summary of economic issues.
Item
Likely effect relative to status quo
Closed border Legal migration
Wage rates Minimal to none (wage penalty disappears) Minimal to none (wage penalty 
disappears)
Work duration Minimal Minimal
Technology Labor-saving technology developed and 
adopted
Technology neutral among productive 
factors
Crop mix Shift away from labor-intensive specialty 
crops
No change
Capital flows Potential production shift to 
other countries
No change1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1) CHOICES 63
can provide useful information on
the economic effects of alternative
approaches. The effects discussed ear-
lier are summarized in Table 2. Con-
siderations particularly relevant for
agriculture are offered below.
Closing the Border
Closing the border is frequently dis-
cussed as one option in immigration
reform. The Secure Fence Act of
2006 takes a step in this direction.
However, there is considerable doubt
raised in the literature about the
effectiveness of previous efforts to
reduce the flow of illegal workers
across the border (Hanson, Robert-
son, & Spilimbergo, 2002). At the
core of the problem are wage differ-
entials between the United States and
Mexico on the order of six to one
(Freeman, 2006). When illegal work-
ers are willing to risk their lives for
the opportunity to work in the
United States, it is highly question-
able that fencing or other approaches
will achieve the desired end. At best,
the approaches can make it more dif-
ficult to enter, and therefore a higher
risk to potential entrants. But, if
immigrants are already willing to pay
the ultimate price, the reduction may
be less than hoped for by the policy’s
proponents. Moreover, rising deaths
among border-crossers will eventually
exceed a politically acceptable level
for a “nation of immigrants.”
Suppose for the moment that the
border were effectively closed, all
undocumented workers were
deported, and no guest workers were
permitted, much as the approach of
H.R. 4437 (109th Congress). With
the proposed two-year window for
removal of illegals, the industry
would be likely to adjust quickly to
the new environment. Three likely
adjustments would be changes in
product mix, production techniques,
and capital flows. While significant
increases in the relative importance
of specialty crops occurred with the
inflow of foreign workers since the
1970s, it is questionable that the
increase would be extensively
reversed. A more likely scenario is
that production techniques would
adjust to the new environment,
adopting more labor-saving technol-
ogy. There might also be a flow of
capital out of some specialty crops to
production areas outside the United
States.
The remaining question concerns
potential changes in wage rates for
agriculture under a scenario of no
access to foreign workers. The wage
rate that agriculture pays is largely
dictated by the wage rate paid for
unskilled labor in the much larger
nonfarm economy. As indicated
above, past levels of immigration
have been estimated to have only
minimal negative wage effects on
unskilled native workers; most agri-
cultural employment draws from the
unskilled labor market. As long as
agriculture employs largely unskilled
labor, wage rates are not likely to sig-
nificantly change in real terms,
regardless of the level of foreign
workers.5 The way that labor earns a
premium above the unskilled wage
rate is to develop skills that are in
demand in the economy, thus mov-
ing out of the unskilled labor pool. In
the absence of higher productivity,
there is little basis to argue that a per-
son’s wage will increase. Only if agri-
cultural employers shift to employ a
more highly skilled labor force would
the average real wage rate for the
industry be expected to change sig-
nificantly. Although this is a poten-
tial outcome of a highly restrictive
immigration policy, it is not the same
as a wage increase. The average wage
rates may be higher, but they would
be higher because the composition of
the labor force had changed to be
more highly skilled, on average. The
wage rate of unskilled workers would
still remain at its nearly constant level
in real terms. In this scenario, tech-
nology and/or the product mix
would have changed to require fewer
unskilled workers and relatively more
skilled workers.  The important
point to recognize is that the substi-
tution of skilled for unskilled workers
would not be one for one, but rather,
fewer skilled workers substituting for
a given number of unskilled workers.
Consequently, the wage bill would
not necessarily increase.
Legal Migration
If some flow of people across the bor-
der for work is currently inevitable,
the more relevant issue is how to con-
vert this to a legal flow and determine
its effects. Legal migratory flows
across borders consist of two types:
permanent migration, or immigra-
tion, and temporary migration, tech-
nically, nonimmigrants of which those
entering specifically for work are
guest workers. Most recent permanent
immigrants have been authorized
under the family reunification provi-
sions of the 1965 Immigration
Reform Act. While most are of work-
ing age upon arrival in the United
States, their admission is not on the
basis of an employer request or a par-
ticular job skill. One potential reform
would be to increase the number of
legal immigrants, and to use employ-
ment skills as Canada does as a crite-
5. All workers would now be earning 
the market wage; the undocu-
mented group would no longer be 
present earning the market wage 
less the legal status penalty.  To the 
extent that the legal status penalty is 
a risk premium for the employer, 
the employer’s cost per worker 
would remain unchnaged.64 CHOICES 1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1)
rion for entry. Other possibilities are
to auction visas to prospective immi-
grants (Freeman, 2006) to capture
some of the gains that immigrants
achieve through immigration, and
assure that those with the greatest
potential and desire are the ones who
gain entry for immigration. Regard-
less of the approach, Congress would
have to determine an upper limit to
legal immigrants. Recent Congres-
sional proposals have addressed for-
mal immigration through potential
paths to permanent residency for
existing undocumented workers,
their families, and proposed guest
workers. There was no political senti-
ment prior to the November election,
if at all, to adopt the latter proposals.
Nonimmigrant guest worker pro-
grams are an alternative to perma-
nent immigration and serve as a
means of augmenting the labor force
typically to meet specific expressed
employment needs. They are typi-
cally for limited employment dura-
tion and incorporate numerous regu-
lations, as in the existing H-2A
program for agriculture regulating
the terms of employment, and partic-
ularly the minimum wage for guest
workers and their domestic counter-
parts at the same employer.
Two sets of guest worker propos-
als were set forth in the 109th Con-
gress: a general guest worker pro-
gram, and a program specifically for
agriculture (AgJOBS). Both appeared
separately in various Senate bills, and
both were encompassed in S. 2611.
Two features of these proposals have
been politically problematic: allow-
ing illegal workers meeting certain
requirements to become legal guest
workers, and opening a path to per-
manent residency for guest workers
meeting various employment criteria
and law-abiding behavior.
A concern specific to agriculture
is that if all currently illegal workers
become authorized, there will be an
immediate exodus from agriculture
to nonfarm jobs. The available evi-
dence on this issue does not support
the contention. Perhaps most impor-
tant is that employment in agricul-
ture is no longer the primary source
of employment for illegal workers.
Over half are employed in three
broad industry groups: construction
(20%), leisure and hospitality (17%),
and manufacturing (14%) (Passell,
2006). Moreover, available evidence
is that illegal workers approach
employment in agriculture in the
same way that domestic U.S. workers
have for generations: few look to
manual labor in agriculture as a life-
time career. The present employment
pattern with illegal workers does not
appear greatly different than it has in
the past with domestic workers: they
remain in agriculture for a few years
a n d  t h e n  m o v e  o n  t o  s o m e  o t h e r
mode of employment. Clearly, there
are some who choose to work in agri-
culture for a lifetime; however, that is
not the case for the majority of hired
farm workers. 
The AgJOBS proposal addresses
the industry concern by incorporat-
ing required periods of work in agri-
culture if a formerly illegal worker
authorized under the program is to
be eligible for continued work in the
United States, and subsequently a
path to permanent residency. In
addition, AgJOBS would maintain a
streamlined H-2A program specifi-
cally for employment in agriculture.
While there are clearly unique aspects
of agricultural employment, restrict-
ing employment to one industry
raises additional concerns. One of the
ways that workers address working
conditions and wages that they find
unsatisfactory is by terminating their
current employment and seeking
employment elsewhere where work-
ing conditions better meet their pref-
erences. Workers who are tied to a
single employer or industry have lim-
ited ability to address work-related
problems. As a result, they tend to be
addressed by additional regulations,
and often litigation. Freedom of
movement by workers among
employers and industries may be far
more effective than regulations in
establishing agreeable working condi-
tions and wages.
In closing, there are two realistic
options: do nothing, or establish a
legal mechanism for migration. Clos-
ing the border is not a viable option:
the economic pressures to enter the
United States from neighboring
countries are simply too great. While
doing nothing is always an option,
the approach goes against the
national fabric of a “nation of laws.”
Instituting legal mechanisms for
migration formalizes the process by
removing workers from the shadows
and employers from a guessing game
about the legal status of their
employees. Regardless of the
approach taken, research has shown
that technical changes in the produc-
tion process and product mix
changes address most of the required
economic adjustments, leaving the
structure of wages largely unaltered.
Workers switching from an illegal
status to a legal status will command
a higher wage, but it is not unreason-
able to argue that employers are
already incurring that wage differ-
ence as a risk premium due to
employees in an illegal work status.
The nation gains overall through
added economic activity of the tem-
porary or permanent migration aug-
menting the labor force. The immi-
grants and complementary factors of
production (land, capital, and com-
plementary labor) capture the gains,
and substitute labor absorbs any
losses. Wage losses through migra-1st Quarter 2007 • 22(1) CHOICES 65
tion, however, have been extremely
difficult to demonstrate.
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